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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
11 I 'I 1 
v • 
f' l Cl i [It l f f S -
Ap[ 1 <cllcir1t 
• S. DAVIS, CHARLEY 
RAUl1, 
1r.·J1v1dcals, and CiiATILLIOIJ, 
a Utat1 cor1)vtat1or1, 
DefenJant s-
Responclerit s. 
Ccise t<o. 19024 
APPELL.l\:JTS' BRIEF 
OF THE CASE 
Appellants obtained a default judgment against respon-
J1·1d s Davis and .Jose,ir1 wr11ch w.:is then later declared to have 
bePn satisfied as to the claims of appellant Shelby Taylor by 
reu.C'Jn of the transf<e:r of certain property, notw1tnsta11uir1g tlle 
fdct that several conditions precedent agreed to by the parties 
r..,•J not been fulfilled, anJ tt1en modified and ott1erw1se set 
aside as to appellant Mascaro notwithstanding the fact that two 
prior mot ions to set aside the default JUd<Jment based on the 
same grounds had been denied by two other district court judges. 
DISPC1ecITION Of' THE CASE Ill THC LOllI:R COURT 
A default JUJ<3ment was taken ayainst respondent-
:• f ,_·11 idJll John Duvis and Charley Joseph in favor of 
":i''--'llant-plaintlff Jusep!1 11ciscaro for ttie sum of $205,869.16 
-1-
and in favor of appellant-plaint i[f Shelby Tdylur for ti": 
of $85,706.00. 
Respu11-te11t...; lld\J 1 s t l1> r {·clt l l·t 
before tlie Honorable James Sc»IJf"· 
Judge Sawaya, whose order is dated February 13, 1981. 
After respondent Char le} Jusev11 obtd111eJ new· cuCJn.oel, 
he brought another motion to set aside the default judgment, 
which mot ion was denied '.Jy the order of Jud•3e l!ec111 Cor1J•cr -lat eo 
January 28, 1982. 
After again counsel, re:oponJent 
Joseph brought a mot ion for a Rule 62 ( h) stay of execut ior1 
which was granted by Judge Dee's order signed March lG, 1982. 
After a settlement conference before Judge Sawa1a 
involving all the parties to the action, 
Joseph brought a motion before Judge Dee to enforce the settle-
ment agreement, which morion was granted by Jc1d•3e Dee's otder 
and judgment signed November 5, 1982. 
Respondent Cnar ley Josepr1 ne>a br ouytn a thud mot i0n 
to set aside appellants' default judgment, which motion was 
heard before the Honorable David Dee on January 5, 1983. 
Dee modified in part and set aside in part appellants' dtcfaulr 
judgment and in the same ruliny heLJ tnat resµonder1t Charlce,· 
Joseph did not participate in and was not responsible for a111 
embezzlement of funds from the partriersl1ip. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of Judge Dee's order 
1tl/Hl<J in putt anJ setLing aside in part appellants' default 
JuJ<jment, a reversal of Judge Dee's order enforcing a settle-
"1'-'"' agree111ent and a reversal of JuJg<: Dee's order stating 
appellants from executing against respondent Joseph on their 
.J•,fault Judgment. 
STA?CMElJT OF 
Partnership Formation anJ Transact1ons. 
Sometime prior to April 1978, appellant Joseph Mascaro entered 
i:Ho an informal partnership With respondent Charley Joseph for 
the purpose of obtaining and developing real property. On or 
Aprill, 1978, the Mascaro-Joseph parLnership obtained an 
opt ion from appellant Shelby Taylor to purchase approximately 
ei3hLeen acres of land in Lehi, Utah county, State of Utah, for 
the sum of $96,000.00. 
2. ) 
(Davis June 1981 Deposition, p. 19, R. 
on September 11, 1979, the nascaro-Josepl1 partnersnip 
having found a buyer for the Lehi property, simultaneously 
exercised ltS option with Taylor anJ sold that property along 
wuh some other land to the new buyer, defendant Chatillion, 
Inc., for the sum of $140,914.09 in cash and an agreemenL to 
deed to the partnership eight lots worth $30,000 each in Plain 
Clty, Utah. (Josepr1 June 1981 Deposition, p. 18, R. 4.) 
Funds by Davis and Joseph. 
The funds received from Chat1llion, Inc., which was represented 
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at all times by its major sh<lreholdt·r and 
Baum, were taken tJ/ tt'Sliond•_nt lJd \J l :, I ,_,[ 
(Davis June 1981 Deposll ton, t't'· SlJ-',9. ,;1L t) )_. 
the knowledge or aµrr oval (J t MasccHo, 
and converted said funus to his o,;r, use. (Joseµl1 Septer:iCJel 
1981 Deposition, pp. 8-9 R. 165.) AttOttlej Dct'.'l..=, 
withdrew from his trust account the remainder of tl1e funus a 11 J 
converteJ them to his own use. (R. 136, 
Defrauding of Joseph Mascaro. Both Charley Joseph a11u 
John Davis continued to represent to appellant Mascaro that the 
funds from the Chatillion transaction were ir1 Davi.:;' t ! USL 
account and would be disbursed to the partnership after tr1e 
transact ion had been co1:iplet ed and C:iat i 11 ion had tender eu tne 
promised 
58-59.) 
real property. June 1981 Deposition, pp. 
Appellant r.1ascar0 made repeateu re4uests to 
dents Joseph and Davis for an accounting of the funds receiveJ, 
but such re4uests were uniformly denied. (R. 5, 47-4d.) Eve11 
after the default judgments against Joseph and Davis 11ad bee11 
entered and the initial effort to set t l1e11t as iJe nctu Dee,1 
denied, both Davis and Joseph claimed ir1 thelI deposu ioris that 
to their kno1Jledge the fu11ds rece1veu by tne pcirt11ers1.i 1 • we1e 
in the trust account of respondent Davis. 
Davis and Joseph continued to claim tl1at the 1 hau nut i11ui'd-
dually received any funds from the trust account. ( R. 13 b. ) 
-4-
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Discovery of Conversion. After the June depositions 
uf John Davis and Charley Joseph, appellants were able to 
"1r1 all urJer from the court allowing the discovery of Ddv1s' 
trust account. That discovery disclosed that there were no 
funJs in the account and there hacl been none since before tlie 
(R. 119, 136.) Thereafter in the 
September deposition of Chacley Joseph, h1s memory refreshed by 
seeing copies of two checks from his attorney Davis' trust 
account maJe out to him as payee for the sum of $18,000.00 and 
$20,000.00, Joseph admitted that he did receive $38,000.00 from 
the funds received by the partnership (Joseph September 1981 
Deposition, pp. 8-9, R. 165) and that the distribution of this 
sum to him was done without authority from or the knowleuge of 
his partner, Joseph Mascaro. (Joseph September 1981 Deposi-
t ion, pp. 18-19.) 
The remaining aprroximately $100,0UO.OO of funds had 
been embezzled by John Davis. (R. 136, 165-166.) 
The To Shelby Taylor. The agreement 
between appellant Shelby Taylor and the Mascaro-Joseph partner-
shir was that the cash proceeds from the sale of tt1e Lelu 
property would be used to purchase sorae income producing 
properr y for aprellant Shelby Taylor. After the receipt by the 
Mascaro-Joseph partnership of the approximately $140,000.00, 
Joseph Mascaro proceeJed to attempt to fulfill the partner-
ship's obl1qations to Shelby Taylor. Some income producing 
property acceptable to Taylor was located and Joseph Mascaro 
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paid in excess of $10, 000. 00 of his own monies as a uow 11 _ 
payment on this property. (Davis Ju1He 1981 Depusit ion, [l\!. 
37-38; Joseph September 1981 uepusllion, pp. 17-18.) Tll l' t U ]Ir I 
previously receiveJ by the Mascdro-Jusepl1 pci1 t11<0r:ol1i,• t1d.J 1,., .. ,, 
specifically set aside to repay Joseph Mascaro tl1t0 sums thctt lif. 
had put forward and to make tl1e balance of tht0 payments 011 tlie 
property. Due to what can only be char act er i zec.I 
embezzlement from the partnership by responJents Davis and 
Joseph, no such funds were available. Therefore, the in corns 
property for appellant Taylor was foreclosed on and the funuo 
invested by appellant Mascaro out of his own pocket were l OS t. 
(Davis June 1981 Dep0sition, p. 38.) 
Commencement of L1t is at ion. On May l, 1980, 
appellants Mascaro and Taylor fl led a complaint in the 
above-entitled action; (R. 2-9) and on June 5, 1980 a Jefaulr 
judgment against respondents Davis and Joseph was signeu by 
District Judge Bryant H. Croft. 
On February 6, 1981, respondents Davis ana Jose1J:, 
brought a motion to set aside the default JUdgment which was 
heard by the Honorable James S. Sawaya. This motion was den ieJ 
by Judge Sawaya's order dated February 13, 1981. ( R. 89.) 
Aft er obt ain1ng new counsel (by reaso11 of an or dter ot 
the court requHing him to do so), respondent Joseph again 
brought a motion to vacate the defciult Judgment, whicn was 
heard this time by the Honorable Judge Dean E. Conder. (F. 
163-164.) This motion to vacate the Jefault 
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l1kew1se denied by Judge Conder with an order dated January 28, 
1n2. 
I l L'n. 
( R. 24 S. I 
Rul1n3 by Juu9e Dee on u Motion For Stay Of Execu-
Un February 19, 1982, respondent Charley Joseph brought 
d mul ion for a Hu le G2 ( h) stay of execution on the uefault 
Juclgment which was heard before the Honorable Judge Daviu Dee. 
IR. 258-259.) Over the obJections of appellants (R. 348-355), 
on March 16, 1982 Judge David Dee signed an order which 
incluued the following language: 
3. This court retains continuing Jurisdiction 
over this case. 
4. Although this case has been brought in the 
posture of a debt owing, as between Joseph 
Mascaro and Charley Joseph, it is, in fact, more 
correctly viewed as a dissolutionment of their 
partnership. 
5. That this court, therefore, intenus to treat 
the matter as a dissolution of che partnership, 
intending to become fully appraiseu of both the 
partnership debts and the partnership assets. 
6. That this court intends co requue payment 
of all legltimate partnership debts out of the 
partnersl1ip a3sets and to divide ct1e partnersl11p 
proflts equally among the partners. Therefore, 
all partnership assets acquired by the plaintiffs 
and Charley Joseph are to be preserved until 
dispersed by order of this court. 
7. This court views that the embezzlement of 
approximately $100,000.00 by attorney S. 
Davis to be crux of this dispute. 
8. That as John 
the partnership at 
each partner will 
realizeu from said 
assets hall been 
efforts to execute 
(R. I 
s. Davis was the attorney for 
the time of this embezzlement, 
share equally what loss is 
embezzlement after John Davis' 
exhausted through counsel's 
on the judgment against him. 
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This order signed by Judge Dee had tt1e effect of 
completely changLn<J the l'OSture of t ht::> t_-' all d v 1 r t u c1 l 1 
lifting the judgment against respondent Charley Jose[>t1. 
Pretrial Settle111ent Conferenc!C. On Ma:; 11, 
pretrial settlement conference was held before the 
James S. Sawaya. ( R. 40 2. ) At this settle:.1er.t cunftotence, 
defendants Curtis Baum and Chatillion, 
the Mascaro-Joseph 
Plain City, Utah. 
partnership eight 
Appellant Taylor 
the eight lots in full satisfaction 
Inc. agreed to tender to 
lots of recil pruperty u1 
agreed to accept four of 
of his JUdr3ment, provHku 
certain improvements (i.e., streets, curb and gutter, etc.) 
were installed by Baum and Chatillion and provided that evi-
dence could be produced that the lots in question were selling 
for cash and in an amount of at least $30, 000. 00 per lot. 
Appellant Mascaro agreed to accept two of these lots in partictl 
satisfaction of his JUdgment based on the same co11ditions. 
final two lots were co be held in escrow with the court pending 
a resolution of the remainder of the Judgment against respon-
dent Joseph. Defendants Baum and Chat ill ion, Inc. were 
required by the settlement a:ireei"ent to install the requueJ 
improvements and provide documentary evidence of sales in the 
area. ( R. 522-525.) 
Judge Dee's Ruling Enforcing Settlement Agr ee1oent. 
The required improvements were never made. When documentation 
on sales of adjacent lots was produced, it sho,1ed that sevetcti 
lots in the area had been traded and bctrtered. There was, 
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however, no evidence of any lots being sold for cash. (R. 
' - s ) In tt1e meantime, the eight lots were tendereJ into 
ruurt by defendants Baum and Chatillion. As the appellants did 
r1ot believe that the property tendered by Baum and Chatillion, 
Inc. could have been sold for $30 ,000 .00 per lot in cash, 
appellants refused co accept said lots as satisfaction of tneir 
Judgment 
On !lover;iber 5, 1982 Judge David Dee signed a1i order 
enforcing a settlement agreement in the above-entitled matter 
·..i!Jich r eguu ed that apl.-'ellant Taylor accept as co111plete satis-
faction of his judgment four of the lots, and requiring that 
appellant Mascaro, in partial satisfaction of his judgment, 
accept two of the lots. (R. 579-586.) This order was signed 
not withstanding the fact that the improvements were never made 
as required and that the lots did not have a proven cash value 
of $30,000.00 each. Defendant Chatillion, Inc. is now in 
bankruptcy and the lots in question are tied up in that 
proceedinlJ . 
. Joseph's Thud Mot ion to Vacate Default Judgment. On 
January 5, 1983, respondent Joseph for the third time brought a 
mot ion before the court to vacate the default judgment against 
him. ( R. 
Hunorable 
111u< ifying 
Judgment. 
482-487.) 
Judge David 
in part and 
This motion was also heard by the 
Dee. Judge Dee 
setting aside 
then signeJ 
part the 
an order 
default 
Tne order by its language el11unateJ tt1e remainder 
of appellants' default judgment as against respondent Joseph. 
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The court determined that the claims of ap1•ellant J,u 
been fully and 
transfer of the four and therefore Taylor's .ictiur, 
though to this date appellant Taylor hciS never personalJ; 
received any of the lots, reCJardless ot their v..::1. l ue, nor 
received any or her consider at ion for his JUdCJment. The orcler 
further had the effect of determinin<J that responue1ot JuSE:[•:, 
did not participate in the embezzlement of the funds, desplte 
the fact that the only evidence before the court was to t11e 
contrary. The order did, however, attempt to compensate Joseph 
Mascaro for the more than $10,UOO he paid out of pocKet as 
as for the $38,000.00 taken by C11arley Josetih from the partner-
ship by granting to Mascaro the two said lots. 
of his judgment as against respondent Joseph was lifted. 
(Judge Dee's Order Not in Record.) 'l.'hus, tlie case hd.s Uee11 
fully ruled upon as to every claim, elther by a judgment or b1 
a dismissal, and the case is ripe for al)peal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE DEE ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEllDANT-RESPOIWEtrr 
CHARLEY JOSEPH' s 110TIU!l r;:u VA::. ATC Atrn SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE SAME MOTION, 
BASED Oil THE SAllE ARGUME!lTS, liAD BEE;I DEtHt:lJ u,, 
TWO PREVIOUS OCCASIONS BY OTHER DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGES 
It is well-establishecl law in t lie ::.;tat e of Ut d:1 tt,Jt 
one District Court Judge may not overrule the rul1njS ol 
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anoc her Disc r icl Court Judrje. State v. Morgan, 527 P.2d 225 
11 tc1lr 1974); Pccters•_>n v. Peterson, 530 P.2c! 821 (Utah 1974;; In 
r•" __ 537 P.2d 312 (Utah 1975); Madsen v. Salt 
Lci 1.r· c;ct1r)ul Boac", G4S P. 2u 6'.i8 (Utah 1982). Section 78-7-19, 
Utah Cod"'. Ann. ( 1953), specifically provides that: 
If an application for an order, made to a judge 
of a court in which the action or proceeding is 
pending, is refused in whole or in part, or is 
granted conditionally, no subsequent application 
for the same order can be made to any uttrer 
Judge, except of a higher court; 
The statutory law and case law of this state are 
consistent in holding that a District Court Judge may not 
overturn the rulings of another District Court Judge. 
A. The Claim That Attorney John Davis Perpetuated 
Fr au•J On The Court \las Arguecl By Attorney Dale Pott er In 
DefenJant Josepn's Seconcl Motion To Vacate The Default 
Judge Dee in his order mocl1fy1ng in part and setting 
aside in part the default judgment against Charley Joseph 
st at ed that: 
This court having determinecl that the default 
Judgment previously entered in this matter on 
June 5, 1980 was entered as a result of the 
intentional, deliberate and malicious fraud of 
attorney John s. Davis, an officer of tlie court, 
which fraud so completely thwarted the process of 
just ice that the default judgr.ient, 1n fau ness 
and good conscious, should not be permitted to 
stand; 
That claim of respondent Joseph that his attorney, 
rPspondent Davis, intentionally perpetuated a fraud on the 
cuu ct 11 a 3 argued by r estJondent Joseph's second attorney, Dale 
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Potter, in Joseph's second motion to vacate default JUdCJment 01 , 
October 14, 1982. 
attorney Potter argued on behalf of Joseph a:o follows: 
This rnol 1on is rnade on t lie (Jr uu11J t t1al t lH' 
default Judgment hereir1 WiiS taken ihJcti11st JusE·pl1 
through the fraud, misconduct dnd i11tentio1.cJl 
negligent and violation of fiduciary duty by 
Davis, Joseph's attorney, wl1ose actions ut 
embezzlement placed his interest in opposition to 
Joseph's. As a result of this fldud peq)etuateu 
by co-defendant Davis, defendant Joseph has been 
denied a fair op;:>urt unuy to have lll:o posit io11 
heard on the merits. 
In his supporting me111oran'3u1.1 attorney Potter stated ac 
one of his three major points that: 
Judge 
';'he Judgment lias 
Davis, An Agent 
Unaware And Did 
tlegligence. 
This which 
Obtained BJ 
To Joseph. 
Tt1e Fr auu Of John 
Mr. Joseph \'las 
Davis' Fraud Or Not Share In 
was arguecl to and co11sidered 
Conder, is exactly the same claim which was argued 
b• j 
attorney Joseph Tesch in resrondenr Joseph's thircl mot io11 to 
vacate the default judgment. In his memorandum in support of 
the motion to set aside the defctult JUd•3rnent, attu111e1 7esch 
stated his point as follows: 
Attorney John S. Davis in 
officer of the court and as 
ately per per rated fraud 
justifies relief under Rule 
his caraci ty as an 
a fiduciary, deliber-
on t tie court wlllc::h 
60(b)(7) U.R.C.P. 
Judge Conder in the hearing in which he denied respon-
dent Joseph's mot ion to vacate had heard the arguments of 
attorney Dale Potter that respondent Char lej Jose[Jli haJ •)nl, 
recently learned of the embezzlement by John Davis of ti•' 
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partnership funds. It had been further argued that Davis' 
,-onduct created a conflict of interest between John Dav1s and 
'- har ley Joseph which was the reason why attorney Dav1s had 
never answered the compla1nt and why he had walted so long to 
make a mot ion to set aside the default judgment. (Transcript 
uf January 18, 1982 l1earing.) JurJge Conder, ho>1ever, azkeu 
attorney Potter: 
Now, what has the tilaintiff done that has pre-
vented Mr. Joseph from getting his day in court? 
\lhat you' re say1ng is that h1s attorney, that is, 
Mr. Joseph's own attorney was the one that 
perpetuated the misrepresentation or fraud on Mr. 
Joseph and failed to file. Isn't that malprac-
tice? Isn't that where the attorney is liable? 
(Transcript of January 18, 1982 hearing, pp. 53-54.) 
Judge Conder refused to consider what attorney Potter 
considered as new evidence since the three month time period 
had passed. (Transcupt of January 18, 1982 heaun9, p. 56 .. ) 
Judge Conder, after listening to the arguments and 
reading the memorandum submitting by counsel, stateu his ruliflg 
from the bench as follows: 
You kne'..' the lawsu1t was pending in 1980, in 
January or February of 1980, and I don't remember 
which. And here it is 1982 and that's almost two 
years that have gone by since that time. I 
understand that you have had negotiations and 
tried to work lt out. But I have a very diff i-
cult time because the la'..' says, "Let's put these 
things to rest within a certain time element" and 
sets up statutes of limitation and says in a 
lawsuit it can be brought and can't even be 
brought after certa1n t lmes because of this. We 
say that you can't bring a motion for mistake, 
inadvet t ence, suqH lSe, or excusable neglect or 
newly discovered evidence or fraud after three 
months after a judgment has been entered. 
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And it seems to me those are all the element:; 
that we're talkin<J abuut here. And tl1cit tie i'.riew 
or should have known that Mr. Davis w00 nut duin'J 
the job for h i 111 t 11 at he tt1uu'JI1 t 11 cc 11"" • ll<: w u., 
relying upon negotiations taking place wir huut 
protectir1g his lawsutl th<ll .1as pe11d1n'J dl tl1cil 
time. He knew the lawsuit was pendin'J a11d th<-'n 
the fact that the court has alreadt rulecl u11 it I 
have some grave difficulty. 
The only thing I can do is cleny the 1not io11. 
(Transcript of January 18, 1982 hearing, pp. 57-58.J 
In addition to the claim that Davis committed f1aud un 
the court, Judge Dee in his order modifying in part and setting 
aside in part the clefault jud<.Jment stated as his seco11c1 reasun 
for setting aside the judgment: 
It being determined that defendant Charley Juse,,il 
was not a participant in the fraud perpetrated on 
the court by attorney John s. Davis, but ratner 
was a victim thereof, and by reason of said fraud 
of attorney John S. Davis, was fraudulently 
prevented from asserting otherwise meritorious 
defenses and claims and litigating the issue on 
the merits; 
This claim that defendant Joseph did not participant 
in attorney Davis' fraud was also made by attorney Potter rn 
respondent Joseph's second mot ion to vacate the default JUcFJ-
ment. However, Judge Conder, in his ruling, specifically rule1 
that Charley Joseph "knew or should have known" ttiat att or ne/ 
Davis was not protecting his interests. Pursuant to the 
court's ruling, it is reasonable to assume that, even if 
Charley Joseph did not participate in the fraud, his inaction 
certainly allowed the fraud to take place. 
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B. Only Consented To Have Judge Dee 
ii'<" Defendant Joseph's Motion To vacate Default Jud;iment If 
Pound ';'hat It vlas Brought On Different Grounds Than 
T11•" Mot to11 "'o ·vacate Default Judgment Heard And Ruled Upon BJ 
Judge Conder. 
Judye Dee's order modifying in part and setting aside 
in part default judgment states that: 
The Honorable Judge Conder having previously 
dented defendant Charley Joseph's mot ion to set 
aside default, but having subsequentlj for 
reasons of judicial economy relinquished all 
authority and Jurisdiction in this matter; 
It should be noted that there is nothing in the record 
ro supIJort the foregoing portion of Judge Dee's order tnat 
Judge Conder relinquished all authority and jurisdiction in 
tlHS matter. There is no specific assignment of the case and 
neither judge was at the time the chief judge for the purpose 
of ass1Jning a permanent judge to the case. In fact, since the 
taking of this appeal, Judge Croft has been assigned this case 
for all future mar ters. Further, counsel for aptJellailtS and 
counsel for respondent Charley Joseph met personally with Judge 
Conder on the matter. Judge Conder instructed counsel that 
Judge Dee could rule upon respondent Joseph's motion to vacate 
the default judgment only if Judge Dee found that the r.iotion 
was brought on different grounds than the motion which had been 
heard by Judge Conder. 
Even assum1ny arguendo that Judge Conder had • rel1n-
qurshed all authority and Jurisdiction" in the matter, a claim 
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that Judge Dee could overt urn the decision of Jud,Je CofJJc:r 
directly contrary to th<" :;tatutory lanjUaJe oi 7o-7-J., 
which states without any exceptions that: 
If an application f Ot an ur der, rnuLlt:....: l (l J l..l .J 'J \..: 
of a court in which the action 0( t- 1 r UC t:'t;>cJ l fl (j lS 
penJing, is refuseJ in 1.1ho le 0( in pur t, or 10 
granted conditionally, no sutsequent a1opl1cation 
for the same order can tie maJe to d11y .Jt l1E:::t 
judge, except of a higher court; . 
TtllS lan<3uage aJm1ts of no except ions, part lCt.ilor 1; ao 
claimed by r espondenr Josepli. 
POII1T II 
JUDGE DEE ERRED ItJ GRAtJ':JIJG RESPO/JDE'.Jr CHARLEY 
JOSEPH'S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMEtJT 
BECAUSE JOSEPH FAILED TO use DUL DILIGLIJCI:: AS A 
REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW. 
The record shows that on Mciy 5, 1980 responJent Joscopr, 
was personally served with a sumr.10ns in this action which he 
turned over to his attorney Davis to ans.1er. 
served upon respondent Joseph alleges among other things tl1a1 
Davis had breached his fiduciary duties which tie oweu to botn 
appellant Mascaro and to respondent Joseph and also 
that respondent Davis had commingled the partnershitJ escrow 
funds with his own monies and converted said escrow funds to 
his own use. Respondent Joseph was clearly put on not ice of 
the possibility that his own attorney Davis had embezzled 
substantial port ion of the part nerslllp funds. Joseph wcts also 
put on notice of the fact that there could be a serious 
conflict of interest between liimself and Duv1s. 
In the mot ion to set aside the default Judgment hear, 
by Judge Conder on January 18, Judje Conder spec:ific:all; 
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found that respondent Charley Joseph "knew or should have 
known" that his attorney John Davis was not adequately protect-
1 n1 his interests. In his deposition respondent Joseph claimed 
t hiH he was "flabbergasted" when he found out that a defauh 
Judgment had been taken against him, but he still did not take 
any action to change his attorney. 
deposition, pp. 31 and 32.) 
(Joseph SeptemDer 1981 
In tne affidavit submitted to the Third District Court 
on behalf of respondent Joseph, his wife Trudy Joseph states 
that in a conversation she had with attorney John Davis she was 
told that he had filed an answer on behalf of the Josephs and 
that they had nothing 
learned of the default 
to worry about. Clearly, when Joseph 
Judgment taken against him, he must have 
been aware chat the repeated assurances given to h1m that Davis 
woJld file an answer on his behalf were lies. He thus knew he 
should have replaced his attorney at that time. 
On June 18, 1981 respondent Joseph attended the taking 
of the deposition of respondent Davis. At that deposition, 
respondent Joseph heard respondent Davis per ju re himself when 
Davis testified that he had approximately $130,000.00 in h1s 
trust account from monies he received as part of the real 
estate closing. Respondent Joseph knew the statement of 
respondent Davis was untrue since Joseph himself had taken 
$38,000.00 of the approximately $140,000.00 received by the 
['artnership and he was aware that he had authorized attorney 
to cake some amount for his fees. (Joseph September 1981 
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deposition, pp. 55 and 56.) But after hear inrJ Mr. Davis cornmlt 
perjury, respondent Joseph claims thdt he still Jid nut lY:\ 1,.-,., 
anything was wrong. (Joseph September 1981 deposn1uri, 
57.) Nevertheless, responJent Joseph should iJdVe lieco11 ['ot U. 
not ice that something was amiss with his attorney John Davis. 
But st ill he did not take dny act ion to invest iyur e ot t 0 
replace Davis as his attorney. 
After the deposition referred to al>ove, respun"e.it 
Joseph approached Davis for a clarification as to the money he 
claimed was in his trust account but was tolJ "I don't have tu 
tell anybody where that money is.• (Joseph September 1981 
deposition, p. SB.) The money placed in Davis' trust accout1l 
did not belong to Davis, but belonged to the partnership of 
respondent Joseph and appellant Mascaro. Thus, Davis' ans·wtr 
to Joseph, which was essentially "I don't have to tell you 
where money is," should have put responJent Joseph on 
notice that something was wrong concerning the partnershi1· 
funds. 
Ear 11 er in the s pr in g of 19 81 , R . Dale Pot t er , w t1 o w ct s 
then handling some other matters as attorney for respondent 
Joseph, suggested 
other than Davis 
t 0 
to 
Joseph that he 
represent him 
ITlljht 
in this litigation. But 
respondent Joseph simply ignored this advice. (Joseph Septe1>1-
ber 1981 deposition, p. 33 and 34.) When an attorney employeJ 
by respondent Joseph gave him as his profe:os1onal advice tira 
he should employ a different attorney than Davis in represent-
l"'J t11m, r e:opundent Joseph should have been put on notice tnat 
However, he failed to take any action. 
Tl1is Court has ruled rhar in order for a petitioner to 
t,e successful in his mot ion to vacate a default judgment, "the 
movant musr show r hat he has used due diligence and that he has 
been prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he 
ti ad no control." \lar ren v. Dickson Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 
260 P.2d 741 (1953). See also, Airkem Intermountain Investment 
v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65 513 P.2d 429 (1973). It is clear from 
the facts stated above that if respondent Joseph was not a 
party to the fraud which he claims has been perpetrated on the 
court, then the lack of due diligence was a factor in allowing 
this fraud ro occur. 
Assuming, without admitting, that Davis perpetrateu a 
fraud on the court and that respondent Joseph was not a party 
to such fraud, it is clear that on repeated occasions, respon-
dent Joseph received notice of the possibility of such fraud 
whereas appellants had no indication of any such fraud. Since 
respondent Joseph, by using due diligence which is required 
under Utah law, could have prevented in lar'.)e part or at least 
greatly mitigated the results of any such fraud on the court, 
equuy would require that the burden of such fraud should fall 
on the party whose act ions caused or allowed such fraud to 
'JC ur and nut rJn cin l nnocenr par tj. 
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A. Because DefenJant 
Attorney \Ii th Full Knowled\)e Of 
Be Estopped From Claimin'.] That The JuJ•jrnent SiiuuLi __ :;,.,__ __ 
And Vacated On The Basis Of Tlie Acl1on= On H1:.o A'._lur11•· 
Respondent Joseph was not required to have atlurr,,,, 
Davis represent him. Joseph knew from the time that 
requested Davis to ans·.1er his SUL1mons that Dctvis hacJ also beer, 
served and was a co-defendant in this action. The comrlaint 
served upon Joseph alleged, among otlier things, that appellant 
Mascaro on at least three occasions hacJ demanded from Davis an 
accounting of the escro11 funds, but each dernanJ was refused. 
The complaint alleged further that Davis had commingled the 
escro1' funcJs with his 01rn and diverted such funcJs to his 0-.11, 
use. Appellants' complaint alone should have placed Joseph 011 
notice of the possibility of a conflict of interest bet·.-1een 
himself and Davis. Respondent Joseph engaged Davis to repre-
sent him regardless of his reacJing the comrlaint. 
In the case of Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 
362 (1962 I, the United States supreme Court refuseJ to overtur11 
a District Court's dismissal of an action for failure tu 
prosecute. The petitioner ir1 that case aryued that tre s!ioulj 
not be bound by the errors of his attorney. The court, t.ow-
ever, in rejecting that argument helJ as follows: 
There 
that 
his 
certainly is no r;1erit to the 
dismissal of petitioner's clc.im 
counsel's unexcused conduct, 
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cor1tent ion 
in1puses a1i 
Uri Just penalty on the client. Petitioner volun-
tarily chose il1s attorney as his representation 
in 'he act 10ri anu cannot now avoul the const=-
'l':l_'°nces of the acts or omissions of this freely 
Any other not ion would be wholly 
u1consist ent wu h our system of representative 
iuri, in which each party is deemed bound 
tl_i__the acts of his lawyer/agent and is considered 
tu !;ave not ice of all facts, notice of which can 
upon the attorney. 
[Emphasis added.] 
;n footnote !Jo. llJ of this case, the court noted as follows: 
Clients have been held by their counsel's 
inaction in cases in which inferences of 
conscienc1ous acquiescence have been less 
supportable than they are here and wnen ttie 
consequences have been more serious, e.g., see 
United States B:<rel. Reau v. Richmond, 2 Cir. 295 
F.2d 83, 89 through 90; Egan v. Teets, 9th CH. 
251 f.2J 571, 577 tJ.9; United States v. Sorrento, 
3rd Cu. 175 F.2d 721. Surely if a criminal 
defendant may be conv1cted because he did nor 
have the presence of mind to repudiate his 
attorney's conduct in the course of a trial, a 
civil plaintiff may be deprived of his clair.i if 
he faileJ to see to it that his lawyer acted wit!J 
disrJatch in the prosecution of his lawsuit. And 
if his attorney's conduct falls substantiaITf 
belo11 11hat is reasonable under the circumstances, 
the client's remeJy is against trie attornej in a 
suit for malpractice. But the keeping of this 
suit alive 1:ierely because t tie plaintiff shoctld 
not be penalized by the admissions of his own 
attorney would be visiting the sins of the 
plaintiff's lawyer upon the defendant. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Since res2ondent Josep:i had not ice from the be']innin<J 
of the potential conflict of interest between himself and his 
attorney Davis and chose to have attorney Davis represent him 
ar;/way, it was inequitable for Judge Dee more than two years 
._,i t ., t 1 t1<_· le f a u 11 J u d 'J 111 en t had been e n t e r e d t o set i t as i de on 
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the basis of the fa1lur e of attorney Dav1s to act 111 t ri•_· b•c:o 
interests of responde11L Juset•r1. As c1tE:d al_.,_1'Je, lt1c 
respondent Joseph is an act 1un fur malpractice and r1ut r u 
aside the default JUd']ment Sett1ny as1dl' ttie Ueiault JU'Jj,11•·111 
penalizes the appellants for the sins of Dav1s, wi11Ct1 s 1 :, 
should instead be v1sited un the l1edJ uf res,1u11de1H Jusee,,r1. 
POINT III 
JUDGE DEE ERRED Itl GRAtlTING RESPOllDENT CHARLEY 
JOSEPH'S l·\OTIO!J TO 'JACATE A:ILJ S!::'i' ,'\SID!:: '"'Hi; 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUS8 THE MOTION WAS BROUGHT 
WELL AFTER THE THREE MO!l'i'H Lll1ITAfIUU IHPO:oi':D t3'l 
RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 6D(b) of the Utah Rules of C1v1l 
provides that: 
On ion and upon such terms as are Just ' t ne 
court may in furtherance of Justice relieve a 
parry or his le'] al represent at 1ve from a f1nal 
judgrnent, order, or proceeding for the followin·oi 
reasons: 
( l) 
( 2) 
( 3 ) 
Mistake, 1nadvertence, sur;:irise, UL 
excusable neglect; 
Jlewly discovered 
diligence CO'Jld not 
time to move for 
59 ( b); 
Fraud (whether 
ev iJence which u1 dJce 
have been discovered i 11 
a new trial unuer r(Ulce 
heretofore cJenum1n<.Jt ed 
intrinsic 
or other 
or extrinsic), misrepresentation 
misconduct of an auverse party; 
Charley Joseph's third motion tu vacate tne 
judgment was based upon an allegation of fraud upon tt1e couLt 
brought by his own attorney, Jo:1n Dci'JJS. 
that a mot ion to set aside a default JUd•Jrnent shall "be mac· 
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w1th1n a reasonable time and for reasons of (1), (2), (3) or 
· 1 I not more than three months after the judgment, order, or 
1 '"ceed1n'j was entered or taken." Although the third motion of 
r Pspondent Charley Joseph to vacate the default judgment was 
brought under Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, to which the three month 11m1tat1on does not it is 
clear that respondent Joseph's motion fits in the category of 
Rule 60(b)(3). This Court has previously ruled that a motion 
which could have been brought under Rule 60(b)(l), (2), (3), or 
(4) cannot be brought under Rule GO(b)(7) merely L>ecause the 
three month statute of limitations has passed. 
In respondent Charley Joseph's second motion to set 
aside the default Judgment, his attorney Dale Potter argued 
before ,Judge Conder that the newly discovered embezzlement anJ 
fraud of attorney John Davis could properly form the basis of a 
mot ion r o dismiss under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7). Judge con<.ler, ho11ever, 
rejected this argument and stated: 
I have a very difficult rime because the law says 
let's put these things to rest within a certain 
time elemenr and sets up statures of limitation 
and says in a lawsuit it can be brought and it 
can't be L>roughr after certain r.imes because of 
this. lie say that you can't bring a motion for 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect or newly discovered evidence or fraud 
afrer three months after a judgment has 
entered. 
And ir seems to me those are all the elements 
that we're talking about here. 
(Transcript January 18, 1982 Hearing, p. 57.) 
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POitlT IV 
JUDGE DEE ERRED IN GRANTING RE:.iP(JtJl)t::rn CHAl<l.EY 
JOSEPH'S MUTIOtl TU VA,:l\TE AtJu SLT A.:il[JL iliL 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE DEFAULT 
SUPPORTED HY TllE E\llDCth.:1' OL'JLL'.Jt'LO c'lll:uJ'J ! 
DISCOVERY. 
It is an import ant point that there ha:o 1,eer1 r10 tr iill 
and no evidentiary hearings in this matter. The JUdgmenr 
rendered against respondent Charley Joseph was a 
judgment. However, the facts as developed through d1scovery in 
this case clearly show that both respondents Dav1s and Josc;,;1, 
were involved in the embezzlement of partnership funds and that 
Davis was able to embezzle more than responuent Josep1, 
did. 
When !11s depos1tion was taken in June 1981, res,Jonuent 
Joseph was asked if he had personally received any of the 
$140,000.00 paid by Mr. Baum. Joseph at f lr St tried to avoid 
directly answering the question. When his evasive answer was 
not accepted and he was again asked if he hacl rece1veu anj 
monies from that paid by Mr. Baum, he answered that he coJld 
not remember • (Joseph June 1981 Deposnion, pp. 21 ancl 
Later, in September when respondent Joseph was confronted wltr' 
two checks made out to him l.Jy Davis for a total of $38,00u.Ou, 
which funds had come from monies paid l.Jy Mr. Baum, respondent 
Joseph was caught in his l1e. 
Respondent Joseph did not have tl1e parrnersl1lt' autr,ut-
ization to take the $38,000.00. He never even told h1s part riet 
Mascaro he had taken the money. At the point ln t 11ne tt1at rtie 
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$!H,000.00 was taken by Joseph, it was supposedly earmarked to 
at•t•el lant Taylor's new property. When the $38,000 is 
'''1u1nerJ with the "$4-, $5- or $6,000," respondent Joseph 
that he authorized defendant to take as 
"attorney's fees" (Joseph September 1981 Deposition, p. 55. J, 
enough vf the partnership's ready cash had been dissipated so 
that even if John Davis had not embezzled one penny, the 
property being purchased by plaintiff Taylor could not have 
been paid in full with such ready cash. 
It should also be noted that nowhere in the record is 
there any indication respondent Joseph was acting in the best 
interests of the partnership by taking the $38,000. Thus, 
there is no basis in law or fact for Judge Dee's ruling that 
Joseph was tree from fraud or thac Mascaro hall to participate 
on a 50-50 basis in the loss sustained by the partnership. At 
best that was a subject which could only be determined at trial. 
POINT V 
IT WAS AN ERROR FOR JUDGE DEE IN HIS RULING ON A 
RULE 62(h) MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION SIGNED ON 
MARCH 16, 19 8 2 TO DEPRIVE THE APPELLANTS OF THE 
BULK OF THEIR DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
On February 19, 1982, Charley Joseph's motion for a 
Rule 62 ( h) stay of execution on the default judgment was heard 
before the Honorable Judge David Dee. over the objections of 
aprellants, on March 16, 1982 Judge David Dee signed an order 
which included the following language: 
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3. This court retains cont inuin'J JUr isdict ion 
over this case. 
4 . Al t ho u y l 1 t n i s c as e ha,, b c' " 11 b r u u 'J I 1 t 111 t 1, e 
posture of a debt owing, as bet weP11 Joseph 
Mascaro and Charley Joseph, it is, in fact, mute· 
correctly viewed as a dissolut ionmenr ot tt1eu 
partner ship. 
5. That tt11s court, therefore, inte11ds ro treat 
the matter as a dissolution of the partnership, 
inrending to become fully appraised of both tin: 
partnership debrs and the partnership assets. 
6. That r his court int ends to requue payment 
of all legitimate partnership debts out of the 
partnership assets and to divide tr1e partnership 
profits equally among the partners. Therefore, 
all partnership assets acquued by the plaintiffs 
and Charley Joseph are to be preserved until 
dispersed by order of this court. 
7. This court views that the embezzlement of 
approximarely $100,000.00 by attorney John S. 
Davis to be crux of this dispute. 
8. That as John 
the partnership at 
each partner will 
realized from said 
assets had been 
efforts to execute 
[Emphasis added.] 
S. Davis was the attorney for 
the time of this embezzlement, 
share equally what loss is 
embezzlement after John Davis' 
exhausted through counsel's 
on the judgment against him. 
This order signed by Judge Dee ti ad the effect ot 
completely changing the posture of the case. Prior to the 
motion there was a judgment jointly against Jotlll s. Davis anJ 
Charley Joseph for their defrauding the plaintiffs and t1avinJ 
taken parr nership assets. l\ft er the mot ion, all the culpci-
bility for the fraud was shifted r.o John S. Davis, Charle]' 
Joseph was exonerated, the bulk of the default JUd<Jment acJains1 
him was virr ually lifted and he was given a right r o one-half 
of rhe partnership profits. 
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Since the only motion that Judge Dee was asked to rule 
111")" was a Rule 62(h) stay of execution, the above-described 
[·cit a<Jr aptis in Judge Dee's order go well beyond the scope of 
rul in<J upon a mot ion for a stay of execution. The motion was 
noticed up as a motion for a Rule 62(h) stay of execution. The 
appellanrs came prepared ro argue the merits of the court 
imposing a Rule 62(h) stay of execution upon the appellants to 
keep them from executing upon theu default judgment against 
Joseph. It was clearly improper for Judge Dee to expand the 
scope of the motion and give a ruling which went to the valid-
ny and merits of the appellants' judgment rather than to the 
val1diry and merits of a stay of execur.ion. Moreover, and 
probably as important, the only evidence as such before Judge 
nee was in favor of appellants and not respondent Joseph. 
ciudge Dee therefore could not have ruled as he did absent a 
trial on rhe merits. 
POINT VI 
JUDGE DEE ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT CHARLEY 
JOSE Pl!' S MOTION TO ElffORCE THE SET'lLEMENT AGREE-
MENT BECAUSE THE REQUIRED PRECONDITIONS HAD NOT 
BEEN MET. 
on November 5, 1982, ciudge Dee signed an order enforc-
ing a settlement agreement in the above-entitled matter. This 
setrlement agreement which had been reached as part of a 
f<tet rial conference, regulted the appellants to take as partial 
set tlemenr of then JUdgrnents certain lots of real property on 
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the basis defendants Baum and Chatillion would install cettd 1 ,, 
improvements and thdt the lots hctd d Cdsl1 Villue ui $311,11 
each. However, the terms of Judge Dee's ordecr i'cJnureu ti« 
conditions precedent stipulated to bi the l''-'' ties at 
pretrial conference before Judge Sawaya. The improvements Wete 
never made and the document at ion did nut stiow that the lots lia'c 
a cash value of $30,000.00. These condition precedent had not 
been met at the rime of r he or :Jer and have nor been mer as of 
this date. 
Furr her, the eight lots ir1 Plain City as re4uueu u; 
the settlement agreemenr are now tied up in bankruptcy, which 
makes the likelihood of Chatillion and Baum clearing r he r it le 
to said lots even more remote. These facts notwir.hstanding, 
Judge Dee ordered thar the appellanr s accept r hese lots as a 
partial settlement of theH judgment against respondent Joseph 
and otherwise dismissed appellants' claims with pre]udice as if 
such lots had been properly tendered and accepted. 
COt1CLUSIOt1 
Ir. was error for Judge Dee to grant resµondenr Cl1arlej 
Joseph's third motion to vacate the default judgment obtained 
by appellants rwo years earlier because this same r;1otion baseJ 
on the same grounds had been previously brought before two 
other Distr icr Court Judges antl had Lieen denied by them. Ttie 
motion was nor timely since the three month stature of limita-
tions period had long since run antl since respor1tlenr Joseµn t1au 
failed to use due diligence as required by Utah law. 
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It was error for Judge Dee to sign the order granting 
;1,unJent Charley Joseph's motion for a Rule 62(h) stay of 
»xt0 c ut ion because the order as prepared by counsel for Joseph 
\Vent well beyond granting a stay of execution and had the 
effect of determining ultimate facts in favor of respondent 
Joseph which in fact there had been no trial on the merits and 
when the only established facts before the court were in favor 
of appellants. 
It was error for Judge Dee to grant respondent 
Joseph's motion to enforce the settlement agreement since the 
conditions precedent required by appellants had never been met 
by defendants Baum. 
In short, appellants respectfully request this Court 
to reinstate their default judgment as against respondent 
Joseph and lift the stay on their right to execute on that 
Judgment. 
DATED this day of June, 1983. 
KESLER & RUST 
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harles c. Hanna 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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